File Number: 8678-C12-200605553
Ottawa, 8 August 2006
By Electronic mail
Mr. Michel Messier Mr. Jean Brazeau
Director, Affaires réglementaires Vice President, Telecommunications
Cogeco Cable Canada Inc. Shaw Communications Inc.
5 Place Ville Marie, Suite 915 630 - 3 rd Avenue S.W., Suite 900
Montréal, QC H2B 2G2 Calgary, AB T2P 4L4
Email: email@example.com Email : firstname.lastname@example.org
Mr. David Watt
Rogers Communications Inc.
333 Bloor Street East , 9 th Floor
Toronto , ON M4W 1G9
Re: Review of price cap framework, Telecom Public Notice 2006-5
Dear Mr. Messier, Mr. Watt and Mr. Brazeau:
Pursuant to the procedures set out in Review of price cap framework, Telecom Public Notice CRTC 2006-5, 9 May 2006 , attached are interrogatories associated with this proceeding.
Responses to these interrogatories are to be filed with the Commission, and served on all the interested parties to this proceeding, by 6 September 2006 .
(Original signed by)
Director, Financial and Regulatory Affairs
cc: Bob Noakes, CRTC, 819-997-4429 bob.noakes @CRTC.gc.ca
Attachment Page 1 of 2
Services, Baskets and Pricing Constraints
1201 Refer to paragraph 10 of the Competitors' submission which states the following:
Therefore, a price cap remains appropriate. At the same time market forces should be present in increasing strength in the residential market by May 2007, so that a productivity offset will not be necessary.
Further, refer to paragraph 12 of the Competitors' submission which states the following:
Since there were few, if any, competitive alternatives for services assigned to Category I Competitor Services and having regard to the expectation that ILECs would experience productivity and efficiency gains in respect of these services, the Commission considered that rates for Category I Competitor Services should reflect productivity gains on an ongoing basis. The Competitors submit that this treatment remains appropriate.
Discuss, with supporting rationale, whether and how the Competitors' proposal to remove the X-factor from the pricing constraints for retail services by May 2007, and retain the I-X pricing constraint for Category I Competitor Services, would benefit in the residential market competition.
1202 A) For each of the years 2005 to 2007, provide the following information by company:
i ) the number of actual or projected subscribers of stand-alone primary exchange service (PES) per applicable local forbearance region (LFR) as defined in Forbearance from the regulation of retail local exchange services , Telecom Decision CRTC 2006-15, 6 April 2006; and
ii) the number of actual or projected subscribers of bundles of services that contain PES per applicable LFR.
B) For each of the years 2008 to 2010, provide the information requested in A) above to the extent available. If not available, provide your best assessment of the market conditions for these services for the specified timeframe.
1203 A) Provide each company's current pricing strategy for residential local exchange services provided on a stand-alone basis and in bundles.
B) Provide any documentation (i.e., reports including market reports and consultant studies or analyses, competitive and/or pricing analyses, pricing models, etc.) used to support this strategy.
C) Does the price of the ILEC's standalone local service influence the company's overall price of a bundle containing such a service? If so, please discuss and provide examples.
Attachment Page 2 of 2
1204 Indicate for each company whether it currently offers local business services. If so, specify the types of services offered, where they are offered and the number of lines. If not, indicate whether the company plans to offer such services within the next 5 years. Specify the types of services to be offered, and where the company plans to offer them.
Date Modified: 2006-08-08
1301 Refer to paragraph 22 of the Competitors ' submission. The Competitors state that further rate de-averaging within a band within a province should not be permitted at this time on the basis that not all locations in a band face competition. However, in paragraph 24, the Competitors state that during the transition to competition, the Commission may wish to adopt an approach that would grant additional rate de-averaging flexibility prior to full rate forbearance.
Provide the Competitors ' proposed transitional approach to provide the ILECs additional pricing flexibility prior to forbearance. Indicate whether a percentage market share loss should apply as part of the threshold. If yes, provide the Competitors ' views, with supporting rationale, on the appropriate level.