Study on fraud calls in Canada

In December 2018, the Commission required that Canadian carriers and other TSPs providing voice telecommunications services implement universal network-level call blocking where the caller identification (caller ID) purports to originate from telephone numbers that do not conform to established numbering plans. The implementation date is December 19, 2019.

Universal network-level call blocking will provide Canadians with an additional solution to reduce the volume of nuisance calls. Furthermore, it will ensure that Canadians benefit from an additional level of protection against nuisance calls by addressing those that contain caller ID information that is blatantly illegitimate.

With the implementation of this system, calls with caller ID information that either exceeds 15 digits or does not conform to a number that can be dialed (for example, 000-000-0000) will be blocked before reaching the subscriber.

• The CRTC is taking further steps to support a safe, secure and trusted communications system for Canadians.
• In December of 2018, the CRTC directed telecommunications service providers to implement a system to block calls within their networks by December 19, 2019.
• Providers that offer call filtering services, which have more advanced call management features, are not required to implement this measure.
• This measure is part of an array of actions the CRTC is taking to reduce the number of nuisance calls received by Canadians, while allowing them to still receive legitimate calls.
• The CRTC is working with telecommunications service providers to authenticate and verify the caller ID information and to trace nuisance calls back to their points of origin.
• The CRTC is also encouraging telecommunications service providers to develop tools to reduce the number of nuisance calls received by Canadians.
• Canadians are encouraged to register their number with the National Do Not Call List (DNCL) to reduce telemarketing calls.

• Canadians now have an additional level of protection against nuisance calls! As mandated by the CRTC last year, call blocking comes into force on December 19, 2019.
• FACEBOOK: Canadians now have an additional level of protection against nuisance calls! As mandated by the CRTC last year, call blocking comes into force on December 19, 2019. Canadians should receive fewer unwanted calls thanks to this new safeguard
• Call blocking is here! This new system will automatically block most calls with an unusual caller ID. Some providers may offer more advanced call filtering services. Check with your phone provider for more details.
• FACEBOOK: Call blocking is here! This new system will automatically block most calls with an unusual caller ID. We encourage you to check with your phone provider for more details on the call filtering services that they provide.

1. Why did the CRTC introduce this new policy?
   • The CRTC is taking a further step to support a safe, secure and trusted communications system for Canadians.
   • The CRTC directed telecommunications service providers to implement a call blocking system as a solution to ensure that Canadians benefit from an additional level of protection against nuisance calls.
   • Providers that already offer superior call filtering services, which have advanced call management features, are not required to implement this measure.
2. Why did the industry need 12 months to implement call blocking?
   • Providers required time to make the necessary changes to their network components to differentiate between legitimate calls and those that are to be blocked.
3. Is the CRTC not backtracking on its previous announcement to block all blatantly illegitimate numbers? Previously, the CRTC indicated that there were three circumstances in which a number could be classified as blatantly illegitimate, but is only requesting telecommunications service providers to block two.
   • The Commission identified universal network-level call blocking as a solution to ensure that Canadians benefit from an additional level of protection against nuisance calls.
   • Blocking mirrored calls could result in unavoidable unintended consequences for certain new technologies, such as iWatch and home assistants (i.e.: Google Home/Alexa), which rely on telephone number mirroring for communicating between devices.
   • There are certain instances where mirrored calls are legitimate, such as when one call’s their own number to access their voicemail.
   • There are too many legitimate incoming calls to request telecommunications service providers to block additional types of calls.
   • The CRTC is prepared to take further action if it becomes clear that the industry is not taking sufficient measures to protect Canadians from nuisance calls.
4. Will call blocking stop spoofed calls?
   • Call blocking will stop calls with an unusual caller ID, ensuring that Canadians benefit from an additional level of protection against nuisance calls.
   • Calls that spoof a legitimate number will still get through to Canadians. The CRTC is requiring service providers to implement by September 2020 a framework called STIR/SHAKEN that will enable them to authenticate calls and warn Canadians when a call should be treated with suspicion.
5. What is a malformed number?
   • Malformed numbers would include nonsensical numbers where the digits would not appear in dialing plans. For instance, 000-000-0000, 000-111-0000, 222-022-2222, etc. A malformed number does not conform to the North American Numbering Plan.
   • North American Numbering Plan numbers are ten digits in length, and they are in the format NXX-NXX-XXXX, where N is any digit 2-9 and X is any digit 0-9.
   • It can be assumed that an incoming call with a non-conforming numbers would be a nuisance call.
6. Do providers charge subscribers for call filtering services? If so, why not require all providers to implement a call blocking system regardless of whether they offer a filtering service?
   • Network-level call blocking provides an additional level of protection from nuisance calls, while call filtering services provide a superior level of protection.
   • It will be up to the telecommunications service providers to decide if they charge for call filtering services to recover any costs associated with providing this service.
   • The market will determine if providers are able to charge for this service or if it will be a competitive differentiator.
7. Why did the CRTC encourage telecommunications service providers to provide call filtering services to their customers?
   • Following consultations with the industry, it was decided that call filtering services could help Canadians better manage nuisance calls.
   • Canadians need to have access to sufficient technical solutions to manage nuisance calls and sufficient information to determine whether calls they receive are legitimate or illegitimate.
   • The use of call blocking provides an additional measure of protection from nuisance calls, while call filtering options provide a higher level of protection from these calls.
8. What are call filtering services?
   • Call filtering services provide consumers with optional services that can take certain actions to manage suspect nuisance calls on their behalf. They would:
     • identify in real-time nuisance calls based on an assessment of a multitude of factors, including mass-calling activity and user feedback on nuisance calls
     • intercept and redirect nuisance calls without user intervention, and
     • allow subscribers to maintain individual preferences such as those offered by personal lists of numbers or those based on other factors (e.g. geographic location or time of day) and manage the level of protection they receive from the service.
9. Is the CRTC confident universal network-level call blocking of certain numbers will be efficient in blocking illegitimate calls?
   • Malformed phone numbers are made possible with Voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) services and spoofing technology. They give calling parties the ability to display any caller identification information, thereby permitting rogue actors to conceal their true identity.
   • The use of universal network-level call blocking for non-conforming numbers will ensure that all Canadians benefit from an additional level of protection against nuisance calls.
   • This measure is a part of an array of actions the CRTC is taking to reduce the number of nuisance calls, while allowing Canadians to receive legitimate calls.
10. How will the Commission determine if these new measures will help reduce the number of nuisance calls?
    • The Commission directed telecommunications service providers to track the number of customer complaints they receive regarding nuisance calls.
    • Providers will have to supply this information to the Commission when requested.
11. What else is the CRTC doing to reduce nuisance and unsolicited calls?
    • The Commission identified call blocking as a way to ensure that Canadians benefit from an additional level of protection against nuisance calls.
    • The implementation of call blocking is part of an array of measures tackling nuisance and unsolicited calls. The CRTC also published the following decisions in the fight against nuisance and unsolicited calls:
      • Regulatory Policy setting out findings and technical solutions to protect Canadians from unsolicited and illegitimate calls
      • Decision to implement authentication and verification of caller ID information (STIR/SHAKEN)
      • Report from working group on traceback process
    • The industry on its own initiative is exploring solutions to reduce nuisance calls.
    • The CRTC continues to encourage Canadians to register their number on the National DNCL.
    • The CRTC continues to work with domestic and international partners to address global threats related to unsolicited and illegitimate calls and has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with Japan, the UK, the USA, Australia, and New Zealand to combat nuisance phone calls.
    • CRTC is a member of the Unsolicited Communications Enforcement Network (external link) (UCENet), an international network of enforcement agencies responsible for spam and unsolicited communications
    • These agreements allow the agencies, in accordance with the law, to share information and provide investigative support, upon request. The MOUs also provide for research and education opportunities, as well as staff exchanges and joint training initiatives for the participants.
12. What are mirrored calls? Why not block them?
    • Mirrored calls occur when the calling number is the same as the called telephone number. As such, when the phone rings, callers will see their own telephone number displayed on their caller ID.
    • There are certain instances where mirrored calls are legitimate, such as when one calls their own number to access their voicemail.
    • Blocking mirrored calls could result in unavoidable unintended consequences for certain new technologies, such as iWatch and home assistants (i.e.: Google Home/Alexa), which rely on telephone number mirroring for communicating between devices.
13. What are neighbouring calls?
    • Neighbouring is when the calling number is spoofed to appear similar to the number of the person being called.
    • As such, the incoming call will display local area code and possibly the same central office code or prefix, which are the next three digits.
    • There are too many legitimate incoming calls to request telecommunications service providers to block these types of calls.
    • We want to ensure Canadians receive legitimate calls and want to avoid having calls from family members, for example, inadvertently blocked.
14. What is spoofing?
    • The introduction of Voice over Internet Protocol (“VoIP”) services has given calling parties the ability to display any caller identification information. This practice is known as spoofing.
    • A spoofed number can appear as a string of digits, such as 000-000-0000, a random number, or the phone number of a company, person, or government entity.
    • Telemarketers who make sales calls to customers in Canada have an obligation to identify themselves. Callers who use technology to spoof their caller ID information with inaccurate, false, or misleading information violate this requirement.
    • The CRTC is taking an array of actions to reduce the number of nuisance calls received by Canadians, while allowing them to still receive legitimate calls.
    • In addition to call blocking, the CRTC is working with telecommunications service providers to authenticate and verify the caller ID information and to trace nuisance calls back to their points of origin.
15. How will organizations that use older business telephone systems (i.e. PBX) be affected by call blocking?
    • Call blocking is being implemented as a consumer protection measure in order to reduce the volume of nuisance calls.
    • Telecommunications service providers are working with organizations to ensure that their business telephone systems are compatible with this new measure.
    • Some organizations using non-conforming phone numbers will need to make the necessary updates and reprogram their equipment.
16. How can these organizations remedy any call blocking occurrences and ensure they are able to reach their clients/patients/customers (recipients)?
    • Telecommunications service providers are working with organizations to ensure that their business telephone systems are compatible with this new measure.
    • Some organizations using non-conforming phone numbers will need to make the necessary updates and reprogram their equipment.

The CRTC is taking further action to protect Canadians from nuisance calls by adopting a framework that help consumers. A new authentication/verification measure called STIR/SHAKEN^{Footnote 1} is expected to be implemented by September 30, 2020 and will establish a reliable authentication system for Internet Protocol (IP) voice calls.

The STIR/SHAKEN framework should help combat caller ID spoofing by digitally validating the handoff of phone calls passing through the complex web of networks. This allows the phone company of the consumer receiving the call to verify that a call is from a legitimate source.

• To better protect Canadians against nuisance calls, new measures are being implemented by telecommunications service providers to fight caller ID spoofing. This is the latest step in the CRTC’s broader efforts to combat nuisance and unsolicited calls.
• Once the STIR/SHAKEN framework is in place, Canadians will know, before they answer the phone, whether a call is legitimate or whether it should be treated with suspicion.
• STIR/SHAKEN will reduce the frequency and impact of caller ID spoofing on consumers for Internet Protocol-based voice calls. While the STIR/SHAKEN framework will not be effective on some legacy, non-IP networks, all telephone networks are evolving to become IP-based.
• Caller ID spoofing occurs when callers hide or misrepresent their identity by displaying fictitious phone numbers when making calls
• The CRTC continues to work with its domestic and international partners to address unsolicited and illegitimate telemarketing calls.

• By September 2020, #telecom service providers must have implemented a new caller ID authentication and verification measure that will help reduce #spoofed calls. Learn more: CRTC steps up efforts to combat spoofed calls

1. What is STIR/SHAKEN?
   • STIR/SHAKEN uses digital certificates to ensure the calling number of an Internet Protocol-based call is secure.
   • Each carrier obtains their digital certificate from a trusted certificate authority.
   • The certificate technology will enable Canadians to verify that the calling number is accurate and has not been spoofed.
2. What does STIR/SHAKEN stand for?
   • STIR stands for “Secure Telephone Identity Revisited” and it is a set of technical standards developed by the Internet Engineering Task Force to certify the identity of originating calls.
   • SHAKEN stands for “Signature-based Handling of Asserted information using toKENS” and is a framework developed by the Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions and focuses on how STIR can be implemented within carriers’ networks.
3. How does STIR/SHAKEN work?
   • The STIR/SHAKEN framework digitally validates the handoff of IP-based voice calls passing through the complex web of networks.
   • This allows the phone company of the consumer receiving the call to verify that a call is from a legitimate source.
   • The called party can then make an informed decision as to whether to respond to an unverified call.
4. Will STIR/SHAKEN eliminate all spoofed calls?
   • The STIR/SHAKEN framework will not eliminate all spoofed calls but it will help in combatting spoofed calls that Canadians receive.
   • The implementation of the STIR/SHAKEN framework will ensure that Canadians benefit from an additional level of protection against nuisance calls.
   • This measure is part of an array of actions that the CRTC is taking to reduce the number of nuisance calls.
   • The CRTC continues to work with its domestic and international partners to address unsolicited and illegitimate telemarketing calls.
5. Why does the industry need time to implement STIR/SHAKEN?
   • Telecommunications service providers require time to make the necessary changes to their networks in order to deploy the STIR/SHAKEN framework within Canada.
6. How will caller ID authentication help Canadian consumers?
   • STIR/SHAKEN authenticates and verifies caller ID information for Internet Protocol-based voice calls.
   • Once implemented, STIR/SHAKEN will provide Canadian consumers with information to help them determine which calls are authenticated.
   • This new framework will reduce bad actors’ ability to illegally spoof a caller ID, which trick Canadians into answering the phone.
   • By implementing this system, consumers and law enforcement will be better equipped to identify the source of illegal robocalls and reduce their frequency and impact on Canadian consumers.
7. Are all phones (wireline and wireless) able to use STIR/SHAKEN?
   • STIR-SHAKEN will only work on a network that has been upgraded from traditional telephone service (i.e. legacy networks) to Internet Protocol technology.
   • Telecommunications service providers using this technology will be able to authenticate and verify the caller ID information and inform their subscribers, regardless of whether the call is received on a telephone or cellphone.
   • While the STIR/SHAKEN framework will not be effective on some legacy, non-IP networks, all telephone networks are evolving to become IP-based.
8. Will providers charge subscribers for STIR/SHAKEN?
   • It will be up to the telecommunications service providers to decide if they charge for STIR/SHAKEN to recover any costs associated with providing this service.
   • STIR/SHAKEN provides an additional level of protection from nuisance calls. It will empower Canadians to know, before they answer the phone, whether a call is legitimate or whether it should be treated with suspicion.
9. What is the Canadian Secure Token Governance Authority?
   • The Canadian Secure Token Governance Authority (CSTGA) is the Governance Authority (GA) as part of the deployment of the STIR /SHAKEN framework in Canada. The GA will ensure the integrity of the issuance, management, security, and use of the certificates.
10. What is a Policy Administrator?
    • A Policy Administrator (PA) is selected by the GA and is responsible for applying the rules defined by the GA, including ensuring that the Certificate Authority (CA) implements appropriate certificate management practices and that certificates are issued only to authorized telecommunications service providers.
    • The PA is the administrator and primary trust anchor of the system.
11. What is the Certificate Authority?
    • The Certificate Authority (CA) issues certificates to validated telecommunications service providers.
12. Is STIR/SHAKEN being implemented in other countries?
    • STIR-SHAKEN was created in the United States and is being adopted by carriers and telecommunications service providers in Canada.
    • STIR/SHAKEN is expected to be implemented in the United States by the end of 2019.
    • Other countries and jurisdictions, such as the UK, have also expressed interest in implementing STIR/SHAKEN.
13. What other measures are being implemented to combat spoofing?
    • STIR/SHAKEN is the latest step in the CRTC’s broader efforts to combat nuisance and unsolicited calls.
    • The CRTC has encouraged service providers to offer their customers call-filtering services that provide advanced call-management features. Providers that do not offer these services must implement a system to block certain types of calls within their networks by December 19, 2019.
    • The CRTC is also working with the industry to develop a process to trace nuisance calls back to their points of origin.
14. Why is Canada behind the United States in the implementation of STIR/SHAKEN?
    • Telecommunications service providers require time to make the necessary changes to their networks in order to deploy the STIR/SHAKEN framework within Canada.
    • The CRTC took the necessary time to gather information and determine an appropriate implementation date for Canadian telecommunications service providers.
    • The FCC, the telecommunications regulatory body of the United States, has mandated its providers to implement STIR/SHAKEN by the end of 2019. This decision was made at the sole discretion of the FCC and is completely independent from the CRTC.
    • Canadian service providers will be able to draw upon the experience of their American counterparts in implementing STIR/SHAKEN.
15. Why was Telus selected to perform the call on the Canadian side?
    • Telus volunteered to participate in this test given its experience and expertise in this field. Telus developed the required tools in order to make this call a reality.
    • We would like to acknowledge the work being done by other service providers to better protect Canadians from nuisance calls.
16. What is the difference between STIR/SHAKEN and SHAKEN/STIR?
    • There is no difference between the two designations. They are the same framework.
    • Some countries have opted to use different ways of naming the framework.
17. What is the current list of TSPs that have elected to implement an opt-in call-filtering system?
    • Cooptel
      • “Cooptel Call Manager” (external link) (effective January 2020)
      • Proposed subscription of $2/month (tariff application in-house)
    • TELUS
      • “Call Control” (external link) is currently available to legacy wireline customers in Alberta and British Columbia
      • Basic control is free and offers 25 entries into the respective lists and the ability to view a 10 call call-log
      • Premium call control available for $3/month and allows 100 numbers in the black and whitelists along with a 100 call call-log
      • Per TELUS, customer feedback has been positive
    • Other TSPs offering call filtering:
      • Xplornet
      • Primus
      • City West Cable & Telephone Corp
      • Hay Communications Co-operative Limited
18. What is the current status of STIR/SHAKEN in the US?
    • US Telecom industry implemented STIR/SHAKEN in late 2019 following an expectation set by the FCC.
    • Final testing is currently underway.
19. What does the new regulation require from service providers in the US?
    • The Telephone Robocall Abuse Criminal Enforcement and Deterrence Act came into force in 2019 and requires major voice service providers to implement STIR/SHAKEN by July 2021, should they have failed to meet the voluntary deadline of December 2019 set by the FCC.
20. What is the TRACED Act?
    • The main purpose of the TRACED Act is to strengthen the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) powers to deter and combat robocalls. Thus, robocallers based in the U.S. will face tighter scrutiny and penalties.
    • The TRACED Act:
      • increases the penalty for intentional robocallers that violate the law (e.g. telemarketers who call users even if they have not given their consent);
      • requires voice service providers to develop call authentication technologies at no extra charge for users;
      • started the countdown for a list of actions and regulatory activities that the FCC is required to take during 2020 and beyond; and
      • mandated the attorney general and the FCC Chairman to convene an interagency working group to study enforcement.
21. Why does the CRTC need additional flexibility to share information with its partners?
    • As I discussed in my opening remarks, the issue of fraudulent calls requires a coordinated response.
    • In some cases, our legislative framework doesn’t allow us to disclose information (including complaints data, trends and specifics about campaigns).
    • Amendments to the Telecommunications Act to ensure flexibility would assist us in sharing information with the RCMP, the Competition Bureau and other agencies working to protect Canadians.