



## Telecom Order CRTC 2026-13

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Reference: 2025-259

Gatineau, 16 January 2026

*Public record: Tariff Notice 7723*

### **Bell Canada – Introduction of Large Customer Satellite Access**

#### **Summary**

The Commission received an application from Bell Canada proposing changes to its Special Facilities Tariff to introduce satellite access for a particular large enterprise customer. The proposal would provide facilities for low-speed satellite access linking customer sites in Winnipeg, Manitoba and in Montréal, Quebec to remote sites in northern Ontario and northern Quebec.

The Commission considers that the proposed satellite circuits meet regulatory requirements and that the configuration of the proposed service extends a General Tariff item beyond Bell Canada's normal serving area. As a result, it will enable the provision of Bell Canada's General Tariff services for this large-enterprise customer that would otherwise not be served by the company's General Tariff. Accordingly, the Commission approves, on a final basis, Bell Canada's application.

A dissenting opinion by Commissioner Bram Abramson is attached to this order.

#### **Application**

1. On 18 July 2025, the Commission received an application from Bell Canada proposing changes to the company's Special Facilities Tariff, Item D31 – Satellite Access.
2. Specifically, Bell Canada proposed to introduce Item D31(t) – Large Customer Satellite Access, a custom-designed arrangement for a particular enterprise customer. It would provide facilities for low-speed satellite access (56 kilobit per second channels) linking customer sites in Winnipeg, Manitoba and in Montréal, Quebec to remote sites in northern Ontario and northern Quebec.
3. Bell Canada submitted tariff pages specifying (i) the satellite circuits proposed, (ii) the monthly rate proposed for each circuit, and (iii) the mark-up for each proposed rate, expressed as a percentage. Rates and mark-ups were submitted in confidence.
4. Bell Canada indicated that since it is proposing a customer-specific arrangement (CSA), the service should be categorized as an uncapped service. Therefore, the

proposal would have no impact on the company's price cap indices, and the proposed prices comply with the pricing rules applicable to those services.

5. Bell Canada filed a price floor test that demonstrates that the proposed rates meet the requirements of that test.
6. Bell Canada requested an effective date of 2 August 2025.
7. The Commission did not receive any interventions regarding the application.

### **Commission's analysis**

8. CSAs are developed to meet the needs of a specific customer and are generally housed in telecommunications service providers' Special Facilities tariffs. In the present case, the configuration of the proposed service extends a General Tariff item beyond Bell Canada's normal serving area. The Commission is of the view that it is appropriate for Bell Canada to offer this service as a CSA. The service is therefore appropriately categorized as an uncapped service<sup>1</sup> and there is no impact on Bell Canada's price cap indices.
9. Based on the results of Bell Canada's cost study, which was filed in confidence, the Commission considers that the proposed rates and charges for this service, which have been agreed to by the enterprise customer, meet the requirements for Type 1 CSAs set out in Telecom Decision 2005-27. They also meet the revised price floor test guidelines for Type 1 and Type 2 CSAs set out in a [Commission letter](#) dated 13 June 2005.
10. The Commission is of the view that the addition of these low-speed satellite circuits will enable the provision of Bell Canada's General Tariff services for a particular enterprise customer that would not otherwise be served by Bell Canada's General Tariff.
11. In addition, approval of this application advances the policy objective set out in paragraph 7(h) of the *Telecommunications Act*.<sup>2</sup> The Commission therefore considers that Bell Canada's proposal is reasonable and complies with the relevant regulatory policies.

### **Conclusion**

12. In light of all of the above, the Commission approves on a final basis, by majority decision, Bell Canada's application.

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<sup>1</sup> This is consistent with the definition established in Telecom Decision 2007-27, which states that the uncapped service basket contains all tariffed services that are not in one of the previous baskets or service groups and that are not subject to any upward pricing constraints.

<sup>2</sup> The cited policy objective is: 7(h) to respond to the economic and social requirements of users of telecommunications services.

13. Revised tariff pages are to be issued within 10 calendar days of the date of this order. Revised tariff pages can be submitted to the Commission without a description page or a request for approval; a tariff application is not required.

Secretary General

### **Related documents**

- *Bell Canada – Withdrawal of Audio-conferencing feature of Hosted Internet Protocol Voice service*, Telecom Order CRTC 2026-10, 15 January 2026
- *Northwestel Inc. – Introduction of 1 gigabit per second unlimited business Internet packages*, Telecom Order CRTC 2025-370, 19 December 2025
- *Northwestel Inc. – Modifications to Large Capacity Wavelength Service*, Telecom Order CRTC 2025-192, 1 August 2025
- *Northwestel Inc. – Tariff Notice 1241 – Addition of Speed Option for Special Assembly #4 Layer 3 IP/VPN Service*, Telecom Order CRTC 2025-159, 27 June 2025
- *Price cap framework for large incumbent local exchange carriers*, Telecom Decision CRTC 2007-27, 30 April 2007
- *Review of price floor safeguards for retail tariffed services and related issues*, Telecom Decision CRTC 2005-27, 29 April 2005

## Dissenting opinion of Commissioner Bram Abramson

1. I object, not to the terms and conditions of Bell Canada's planned Montreal- and Winnipeg-ended low-data satellite routes, but to the rates proposed for them. Canadians rely on us to review whether tariffed rates are just and reasonable. At least one route's proposed rate is so high that, in my respectful view, it qualifies as neither.
2. Basic micro-economics teaches that, in the absence of competition, a dominant firm can set prices largely at its discretion. That discretion is constrained, among other things, by user demand. The more indispensable the service, the lower the elasticity of users' demand for it, so the greater the firm's pricing power.
3. Telecommunications services are indispensable to virtually all economic activity. Large-business demand for these services is typically high. The elasticity of that demand is correspondingly low. User demand is therefore insufficient, on its own, to keep pricing power in check. Instead, competition or, in its absence, regulatory oversight are required to stave off monopoly rent-taking.
4. Tariffed services, like the Large Customer Satellite Access on this application, are those where competition is insufficient and regulatory oversight appropriate. To enable that oversight, the service provider submits proposed rates and supporting information. We use these submissions to assess whether the proposed rates are just and reasonable.
5. The public does not have access to the confidential information we do, and relies on the Commission to perform that assessment rigorously. When we do not, unjust rates ripple through the economy, either directly (where the end-users are consumers) or indirectly (where the end-user is a large-business user, as it is here, or a service provider). Accordingly, I must again object to an approach that checks dutifully whether rates are so low as to crowd out hypothetical competitors, but does not meaningfully inquire whether those same rates are unreasonably high.
6. In past proceedings, I have declined to join Telecommunications Committee majorities<sup>1</sup> that uphold what I described as "triple-digit markups" or "eye-watering margins" that "extract excessive profits at the expense of customers who depend on

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<sup>1</sup> On behalf of the Commission: *Telecommunications Committee*, By-Law No. 10 (CRTC), paragraph (e) ("[a]ny act or thing done by the Telecommunications Committee shall be deemed to be an act or thing done by the members [...]"), pursuant to paragraph 11(1)(b) and subsection 12(3) of the *Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act* (duties delegated to standing committees by by-law. As distinguished from assigning a particular file to a panel: *Shoan v. Canada (Attorney General)*, 2016 FCA 261, para 6).

the Commission to safeguard reasonable rates, and [at the expense of] the end-users who depend on the services provided by those customers.”<sup>2</sup>

7. I likewise do so here. Telecommunications services are foundational infrastructure. Their pricing is embedded throughout the economy. When the *Telecommunications Act* assigns us to ensure rates are just and reasonable, this ought surely include ensuring those rates do not embed monopoly rents, which would undermine Canada’s economic efficiency. When we mechanically<sup>3</sup> approve towering mark-ups as, in my respectful view, the majority does on the current decision, we have not understood the assignment. I dissent.

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<sup>2</sup> Dissenting opinions to Telecom Orders 2025-159, paragraph 25; 2025-370, paragraph 3; and 2025-192, paragraph 11.

<sup>3</sup> For instance, by applying by rote a previously set-out framework without turning our minds to whether the framework remains appropriate: see dissent to Telecom Order 2026-10 at footnote 1 and accompanying text.